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Abstract
This paper develops a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model in which intertem-
poral uctuations (and sectoral comovement) are driven by idiosyncratic shocks to relative
preferences between consumption goods. This class of shocks may be interpreted as shifts
in consumer tastes. When shifts in preferences occur, consumers associate a new and di¤er-
ent level of satisfaction to the same basket of consumption goods according to the modied
preferences. The paper shows that, if the initial composition of the consumption basket is
su¢ ciently asymmetric, a shift in relative preferences produces a so strong "perception e¤ect"
capable of inducing inter and intra sectoral positive comovement of the main macroeconomic
variables (i.e., output, consumption, investment, and employment). Furthermore, extending
the theoretical framework to a multi-sector model and introducing a more exible structure
of the relative preference shock, we show that the parameter restrictions, necessary in order
to observe sectoral comovement after a relative preference shock, are much less severe. In
particular, the comovement between the most of the sectors emerges under general conditions,
without requiring high asymmetry in the composition of the consumption basket and/or high
aversion to risk. It is a welcome result that these ndings are reached without introducing
either aggregate technology shocks or input-output linkages, or shocks perturbing the relative
preference between aggregate consumption and leisure.
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1 Introduction
The comovement of economic activity across di¤erent sectors is one of the most important reg-
ularities of all business cycles (e.g., Lucas, 1977). Burns-Mitchell (1946) included inter-sectoral
comovement in the denition of business cycles, and many empirical studies prove pro-cyclical
behavior of cross-sector measures of employment, output, and investment (see Christiano and
Fitzgerald, 1998 and Hu¤man and Wynne, 1999). Since it is di¢ cult to identify reasonable ag-
gregate disturbances capable of explaining historical business cycles, a vast literature investigates
the transmission mechanisms from sectoral shocks to aggregate uctuations. This approach has
dealt with two main challenges: i) the explanation of how sectoral uctuations spread over the
entire economy; ii) the explanation of why sectors move together.
The multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium literature uses productivity shocks and tech-
nological linkages to explain sectoral comovement. In fact, the input-output structure grants
that after an idiosyncratic productivity shock uctuations in each sector take the same direc-
tion.1 On the other side, the role of the demand has been highlighted by Cooper and Haltiwanger
(1990). The authors suggest that the normality of demands for consumption goods is the chan-
nel through which sectoral shocks spread over the economy; meanwhile, the main mechanism of
shocks intertemporal transmission relies on the fact that only few sectors hold inventories. In
this framework, an increase of inventories immediately reduces the production, and the income in
sectors holding inventories. This reduces the demand for the goods produced in the other sectors
and, consequently, the expected positive comovements of employment and output emerge.
Departing from the existing economic mechanisms implemented by the cited literature, this
paper develops a framework without introducing exogenous changes to productivity and intra-
sectoral technological linkages, and without relying on the "income e¤ect" in the spirit of Cooper
and Haltiwanger (1990).
In our paper, uctuations are induced by exogenous shocks to the structure of preferences.
In particular, shocks hit consumersrelative preference between consumption goods. The paper
shows that this class of preference shock is capable of explaining the positive comovements of
output, consumption, investment, and employment between sectors. It is important to highlight
that this kind of shock a¤ects only the relative preference between consumption goods and does
not directly modify the preference structure between the composite consumption good and the
leisure time. In this element, our mechanism di¤ers from Wen (2006, 2007) or Bencivenga (2002)
who investigate the e¤ects of variations in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure.
The stylized economy is characterized as follows. Consider a two-sector economy, where, in
each sector, a distinct output is produced by using labor services (freely mobile across sectors)
and a sector-specic capital stock; the sector-specic output yields one type of consumption good
and one type of investment good that can be used as capital only in the same sector. Such
assumption excludes that sectoral comovement is induced by complementarity in the production
process. Utility is dened over leisure and a consumption index that includes the consumption
goods of both sectors. Next, assume that the consumption index is a Cobb-Douglas (homogeneous
of degree 1) function over the consumption goods. Hence, the modeled preference shifts represent
1Selected references are Long and Plosser (1983), Murphy et al. (1989), Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Hu¤man
and Wynne (1999), Horvath (1998, 2000).
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the one and only exogenous source of inter-temporal, inter-sectoral, and intra-sectoral dynamics
of employment, consumption, output, and investment.
We interpret the dynamics focusing on di¤erent ways of perceiving the same consumption
basket, according to the state of the relative preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the benchmark economy. Section 3 presents
the theoretical mechanism and selected numerical results. Section 4 discusses and extends model
results, and Section 5 concludes. Finally, the Appendix includes all proofs and derivations.
2 A Two-Sector Model with Relative-Preference Shifts
This section presents the baseline dynamic equilibrium model with relative-preference shocks.
Since there are no restrictions to trade, we solve the dynamic planning problem of a benevolent
planner.
2.1 The Benchmark Economy.
The benchmark model is structured as a two-sector two-good economy, with endogenous labor
supply choice. There exists a continuum of identical households of total measure one. The
relative demand for goods are driven by autonomous changes in preferences of the representative
household. Capital goods are sector specic while labor services can be reallocated across sectors
without bearing any adjustment cost.
Preferences. Dene a Cobb-Douglas consumption index in the following way:
Ct = c
s1;t
1;t c
s2;t
2;t ; (1)
where c1;t and c2;t, respectively denote the consumption of good 1 and good 2 at time t; s1;t and
s2;t denote the preference weights, following exogenous stochastic processes (dened below).2 In
this framework, a positive shock to s1;t changes the instantaneous structure of preferences in favor
of c1. In order to analyze the aggregate consequences of only relative preference shifts between
consumption goods, we preserve the homotheticity of degree 1 of preferences and assume that
s1;t + s2;t = 1, 8 all t = 1; 2; :::. Then, it is su¢ cient to specify the characteristics of s1 that
follows an autoregressive process, s1;t = s1;t 1+(1  ) s1+ "t, where 0    1 and s1 indicates
the steady state value. Quantity "t is a random variable normally distributed with zero mean
and variance 2". A relative-preference shock f"1;tg1t=1 is transitory, but because of the preference
structure, it has persistent e¤ects. Finally, it is important to note that Ct is not the aggregate
consumption that is reported in national accounts at time t, is not a macroeconomic aggregate.
Ct is an index that represents the structure of preferences, but we will return to this subject later.
Preferences over consumption index Ct and leisure `t are described by a state dependent felicity
function u(C (ct) ; `t; st) : R2+  S2  [0; 1]2 ! R:
U(ct; `t; st) =
(Ct)
1    1
1   +B`t; (2)
2Also Stockman and Tesar (1995) use the Cobb-Douglas aggregator for tradable consumption goods in a two
country framework.
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where  measures the degree of risk aversion and is inversely proportional to the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution; `t denotes leisure hours. In order to better understand the behavior
of demands for consumption goods, we assume that the marginal utility of leisure is constant and
equal to B.3 Leisure hours are dened as:
`t = 1  n1;t   n2;t; (3)
where n1;t and n2;t denote working hours in sector 1 and 2. The structure implies that available
hours are normalized to 1 and labor services shift across sectors without adjustment costs.
Production Technologies. Each good is produced by physical capital and labor, using a
sector-specic Cobb-Douglas technology:
y1;t = 1k
1
1;tn
1 1
1;t and y2;t = 2k
2
2;tn
1 2
2;t ; (4)
where yj;t, kj;t, and j denote, respectively, output, capital stock, and technology level in sector j,
for j = 1; 2 hereafter. j measures the elasticity of output to capital in sector j. The production
is not subject to exogenous technology changes (i.e., j parameters are constant over time). As
remarked in the introduction, this strongly di¤erentiates our model from the traditional approach
that focuses on the e¤ects of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The allocation constraint is specic for each sector and is given by
c1;t + i1;t = y1;t and c2;t + i2;t = y2;t; (5)
where ij;t denotes the investment ows at time t.
In each sector, capital accumulation follows the standard formulation
k1;t+1 = (1  1)k1;t + i1;t and k2;t+1 = (1  2)k2;t + i2;t; (6)
where j denotes the depreciation rates of capital stocks at time t. Eqs.(4) through (6) dictate
that the capital stock used in sector j is produced entirely in sector j. This hypothesis makes
capital goods xed across sectors and then rules out input-output transmission mechanisms. So,
it is possible to isolate the way preferences drive intersectoral comovements with no inuences of
production processes.
Models Solution and Equilibrium Characterization. Planner maximizes the expected
present discounted value of the return function V0 = E0
P1
t=0 
tU(ct; `t; st), where  (0 <  < 1) is
a subjective discount factor, subject to the allocation constraints (eq.(5)), the capital accumulation
constraints (eq.(6)), and the total-hour constraint (eq.(3)). The state of the economy at time t is
represented by a vector t = hk1;t; k2;t; s1;t; s2;ti. Controls for the problem are consumption ows
c, investment ows i, and the labor services n. Introducing dynamic multipliers 1;t and 2;t,
forming the Langrangean L0 yields:
3 In a following section we show that linearity in leisure is not a necessary condition. This assumption simplies
the explanation of the mechanism underlying the relative-preference shifts in consumption goods.
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max
fcj;t;nj;t;kj;t+1g2j=1
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
8><>:

c
s1;t
1;t c
s2;t
2;t
1    1
1   +B (1  n1;t   n2;t) +
+1;t
h
1k
1
1;tn
1 1
1;t   c1;t + (1  1) k1;t   k1;t+1
i
+
+2;t
h
2k
2
2;tn
1 2
2;t   c2;t + (1  2) k2;t   k2;t+1
io
; (7)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator on time 0 information. First order conditions
with respect to j-th consumption ow and working hours (FOC(cj;t), FOC(nj;t)) read:
c1;t : s1;tc
s1;t 1
1;t c
s2;t
2;t

c
s1;t
1;t c
s2;t
2;t
 
= 1;t
c2;t : s2;tc
s1;t
1;t c
s2;t 1
2;t

c
s1;t
1;t c
s2;t
2;t
 
= 2;t (8)
n1;t : B = 1;t (1  1)1k11;tn 11;t
n2;t : B = 2;t (1  2)2k22;tn 22;t ; (9)
where (1  j)jkjj;tn jj;t = wj;t is the marginal productivity of labor in sector j.
Combining the previous equations, the optimality conditions for sectoral consumptions and
working hours can be rewritten as:
s1;t
C1 t
c1;t
w1;t = B
s2;t
C1 t
c2;t
w2;t = B: (10)
Optimality conditions (eq.(10)) indicate the standard equality between the weighted marginal
utility of consumption (sj;t
C1 t
c1;t
) and the weighted marginal utility of leisure ( Bwj;t ).
Optimal investment dynamics are determined by the following two Euler Equations:
Et
264s1;t+1 C
1 
t+1
c1;t+1
s1;t
C1 t
c1;t

11k
1 1
1;t+1n
1 1
1;t+1 + (1  1)
375 = 1
Et
264s2;t+1 C
1 
t+1
c2;t+1
s2;t
C1 t
c2;t

22k
2 1
2;t+1n
1 2
2;t+1 + (1  2)
375 = 1 (11)
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where Et denotes the expectation operator, conditional on information available at time t. Notice
that the pricing kernel j;t =
C1 t+1
C1 t
sj;t+1cj;t
sj;tcj;t+1
depends on the j  th preference parameters, the level
of consumption of j   th good and the level of consumption index.
The system of the optimal conditions and resource constraints determines the deterministic
steady state; then, the log-linearization of the model around the steady state describes the dy-
namics.4 In the next section we illustrate the parameterization of the model and then we show
the simulation results.
2.2 Parameterization.
The system of equations that denes the dynamic equilibrium of the model depends on a set of
twelve parameters. Six pertain to technology (the capital share j , the capital stock quarterly
depreciation rate j , and the level of technology j in both sectors), while the other six pertain
to consumers preferences (the subjective discount factor , the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
, the marginal utility of leisure B, the relative preference for good 1, s1, and for good 2, s2, and
the autoregressive coe¢ cient of the preference process ).5
The sectors are characterized by the same technology, to make sure that all di¤erences be-
tween the equilibrium values of the sectoral variables derive from consumerspreferences. This
assumption makes it easy to associate the parameterization of the relative preferences between
consumption goods to the composition of the initial consumption basket. In fact, under the sym-
metric hypothesis concerning the supply side, it emerges that c1 R c2 , s1 R s2. Assuming
di¤erences in the supply side would complicate the exposition of the mechanisms with no signi-
cant added value in the understanding of the role of preferences. The model is parameterized for
the U.S. economy based on the post-war period, apart of relative preference parameters that are
set to develop the theoretic investigation. The parameterization is detailed below:
Technology parameters (j ; j ; j) are set to commonly used values in the Real Business Cycle
(RBC) literature. In particular, the paper considers a symmetric economy by the supply side so,
1 = 2 = 0:025, 1 = 2 = 0:36, and 1 = 2 = 1.
Consumers preference (; ;B; sj ; ) : the quarterly subjective discount factor  is set to
correspond to an annual real interest rate of 4%; it yields  = 0:99. The relative risk aversion
 is equal to 5. The relative preference for good 1, s1, varies in the range 0 < s1 < 1. The
autoregressive coe¢ cient of the preference process  is 0:99. The marginal utility of leisure, B is
endogenously calibrated to generate n1 + n2 = 0:3.6
3 Results
3.1 Structure of the simulations
This section investigates how the stylized economy responds to an increase in the relative pref-
erence for good 1. Anticipating a result, the initial composition of the consumption basket is a
4Appendix (A) and (C) reports some steps to determine the steady state values and the dynamic equations of
the model following Uhlig (1999).
5Recall that the preference parameter for good 2, s2, is set equal to 1  s1.
6See Appendix (B).
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key element for determining the sign of inter-sectoral comovements; for this reason, the model is
simulated for di¤erent composition of the consumption basket in steady state.
The simulations show how the dynamics change according to the relative weight of each
consumption good in the consumption basket. In order to explain the emerging results, we
will introduce a "perception e¤ect", which describes how consumers satisfaction, for a given
consumption choice, changes according to the state of preferences. Subsequently, we investigate
the role of selected parameters by some sensitivity analyses.
3.2 Baseline simulations
The paper considers three di¤erent pre-shock scenarios, in detail: a fully symmetric consumption
basket, when s1s2 =
c1
c2
= 1 (s1 = 0:5); two asymmetric consumption baskets in which s1s2 =
c1
c2
= 19
(s1 = 0:1) and s1s2 =
c1
c2
= 9 (s1 = 0:9).
Technically, we run three sets of simulations maintaining the baseline calibration with the
exception of the steady state value of s1. We set s1 equal to 0:1, 0:5, and 0:9, and report the
impulse response functions of the sectoral variables in Figure 1 with blue, green, and red lines,
respectively. To ease the comparison between the consequences of the di¤erent settings, we impose
that the preference shocks have always the same magnitude, specically, 1% of 0:5. It follows that
immediately after the shock s1 moves from 0:1 to 0:105 (blue line case), from 0:5 to 0:505 (green
line case), and from 0:9 to 0:905 (red line case).
[FIGURE 1]
Figure 1, as the gures in the following sections, describes the impulse response functions of
labor services (n1, n2), consumption (c1, c2), investment (i1, i2) and output (y1, y2) of both sectors;
C is the consumption basket as dened in eq.(1) and N is the total employment (N = n1 + n2).
The last two boxes refer to the ratio between the marginal utility of each consumption good and
the marginal utility of leisure (p1 =
Uc1 (ct;`t;st)
Ul(ct;`t;st)
, p2 =
uc2 (ct;`t;st)
ul(ct;`t;st)
), that we can consider the prices
of each good when the marginal utility of leisure is the numeraire. The gure shows the rst 80
quarterly percentage deviations from a scenario where all innovations are set to zero.
The green lines (with s1 = s2 = 0:5) in Figure 1 show an economy where input factors (n2
and i2) are withdrawn from the production of good 2 (y2 and c2 decrease) and are allocated to
sector 1. Intra-sectoral comovements between consumption, investment, employment, and output
are positive in both sectors, but inter-sectoral comovements are negative. In fact, the sector
characterized by an increase in preference (sector 1) goes through an expansive phase while the
other sector goes through a recessive phase. Prices follow the direction of the preference weights.
The blue lines (with s1 = 0:1, s2 = 0:9) show an economy with both sectors in expansion.
Both inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral comovements are positive. Prices comove and notice that
p2 increases while s2 falls.
The red lines (with s1 = 0:9, s2 = 0:1), similarly to the previous case, show an economy
characterized by positive inter-sectoral and positive intra-sectoral comovements, but the dynamics
are completely reversed. The stylized economy experiences a recession in both sectors and in all
variables (consumption, investment, employment, and output). Prices comove with di¤erent
dynamics for p1 and s1.
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3.3 The source of inter-sectoral comovement
Roughly speaking, the representative agent chooses between the consumption of two di¤erent
goods and leisure. Under the preference structure reported in eq.(1) and eq.(2), the marginal
rate of substitution between sector-specic consumption and leisure depends on the consumption
of both goods. In fact, the inuence of cj on consumers utility (i.e., the marginal utility of cj)
is given by the e¤ect of cj on C and by the e¤ect of C on the utility function. If preferences
shift, both e¤ects vary but, as we are going to demonstrate, only the latter can induce positive
inter-sectoral comovement.
In the previous three simulations (reported in Figure 1), after the positive shock to s1 the
ceteris paribus e¤ect of c1 on C increases while the e¤ect of c2 on C decreases.7 This produces a
sort of "substitution e¤ect" that reduces the consumption of good 2 and increases the consumption
of good 1. So, the way Ccj change after a preference shift does not sustain positive inter-sectoral
comovements. On the contrary, the ceteris paribus change of C a¤ects the optimal choice in both
sectors in the same direction. In fact, if C decreases (increases) then the marginal impact of C
on the utility function increases (decreases) and this pushes up (down) the marginal utility of
both goods. We call this change the "perception e¤ect". It does not a¤ect the marginal rate
of substitution between c1 and c2 but it a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution between each
consumption good and leisure.8
The blue line case describes a context where the perception e¤ect increases the marginal
utility of both consumption goods. The reverse occurs in the red line case: the marginal utility of
consumption basket has fallen so that also sector 1 experiences a recession phase. In both cases
positive inter-sectoral comovements emerge driven by sectoral (and not aggregate) preference
shocks. In the opposite, the green lines report dynamics where the perception e¤ect is absent,
then only the substitution e¤ect matters.
Table 1 resumes the possible scenarios after a positive shock to s1.
Table 1 Possible dynamics of consumption after a positive shock to s1.
Before the shock Perception Substitution Final Result
c1 < c2
c1 "
c2 "
c1 "
c2 #
c1 "
c2 "#
c1 = c2
c1 $
c2 $
c1 "
c2 #
c1 "
c2 #
c1 > c2
c1 #
c2 #
c1 "
c2 #
c1 "#
c2 #
Now, lets deepen the argument more analytically. The starting point is the optimal condition
ruling the choice between consumption and leisure in each sector,
7 In Appendix (D) and (E) we prove that Cc1s1 > 0 and that Cc2s1 < 0.
8The preference shock generates a sort of "real wealth e¤ect", if it is assumed that real wealth can be measured
by the level of utility that consumer can reach. Indeed, after the shock the level of satisfaction varies because
the consumer associates di¤erent satisfaction to the same goods. So, the level of satisfaction changes even if the
consumption is xed. But, it is necessary to specify that, even if we adopt the previous denition, this mechanism
would be quite di¤erent from that reported in microeconomic manuals. In fact, the rst element to change is not
the budget constraint but the indi¤erence curve.
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Ucjwj = UCCcjwj = B: (12)
Eq.(12) imposes that in equilibrium the marginal utility of consumption of good j, Ucj ,
weighted with the marginal productivity of labor in sector j, wj , has to be equal to the mar-
ginal utility of leisure, B.9 The marginal utility of cj can be decomposed in the product between
the rst derivative of the utility function with respect to the consumption basket, UC (i.e., the
marginal utility of C), and the rst derivative of such index with respect to the single consump-
tion good, Ccj . The key question concerns what happens to UC after an increase in s1 (as in our
simulations). In order to provide an answer, it is necessary to focus on the signs of two derivatives.
The rst is the sign of the derivative of the marginal utility UC with respect to the consumption
basket (i.e., the second derivative of the utility function with respect to the consumption basket).
This sign is negative (in fact, UCC =  C  1 < 0 for   0).
The second sign concerns the partial derivative of the consumption basket with respect to the
exogenous shock, Cs1 .
10 The sign of this derivative depends on the ratio between the consumption
goods composing the consumption basket, in fact Cs1 = c
s1
1 c
1 s1
2 ln(
c1
c2
).11 In the blue line version
(reported in Figure 1) s1 = 0:1 so c1c2 < 1, and then Cs1 < 0. If C # then UC ".12 In this case,
the direct e¤ect of a positive shock to s1 reduces C and then increases UC . Notice that according
to the optimal conditions (eq.(12)) the product between Ccjwj has to fall in both sectors. This
can occur by both an increase in cj (the derivative of Ccj with respect to cj is negative, in
fact Cc1c1 = s1 (s1   1) cs1 21 c1 s12 < 0, Cc2c2 =  s1 (1  s1) cs11 c s1 12 < 0) and an increase in
employment nj (to reduce wj). The reverse occurs in the case with s1 = 0:9 (red lines in Figure
1).13
This mechanism contributes in explaining the positive inter-sectoral comovements reported in
the cases with blue and red lines, and why the economic booms (dooms) occur after a preference
shock when s1 is set low (high).
Finally, the green lines represent a perfectly symmetric economy: s1 = 0:5, c1c2 = 1, Cs1 = 0.
The direct e¤ect of preference shifts on UC is null and, then, the dynamics of the stylized economy
are driven by only substitution e¤ects between sectoral goods.
In this section we have not described all the forces at work, because we are mainly interested
in the mechanisms that induce positive inter-sectoral comovements. So, as evidenced in Table
1 (by the use of arrows), the initial composition of the consumption basket represents a sort of
9Assuming B constant, the dynamic equation of eq.(12) can be expressed in the following way: ~sj;t   ecj;t +
(1  ) eCt + jekj;t   jenj;t = 0 where the tilde indicates the growth rate. This way of representing the dynamics
characterizing eq.(12) can be helpful to follow the mechanism described in this section.
10We are interested in the direct e¤ect of s1 on C taking the rest as given. So we are not considering the indirect
e¤ect generated by variations in consumption composition.
11Recall that in our model the supply sides of each sector are perfectly symmetric; it follows that the relative
dimensions of steady state values of the sectoral variables depend only on consumers preferences. Then c1 R c2 i¤
s1 R s2.
12Notice that assuming a CES function for the consumption index, the economic mechanism does not change
signicantly. In fact, if C = (s1c
q
1 + (1  s1) cq2)
1
q ; then @C
@s1
= 1
q
(s1c
q
1 + (1  s1) cq2)
1
q
 1
(cq1   cq2), consequently the
sign depends again on the relative dimensions between the consumption goods.
13 It is noteworthy to remark that Cc1s1 > 0 while Cc2s1 < 0. Consequently (not considering the behavior of the
marginal productivity of labor), if Cs1 < 0 an increase in c1 is surely needed in order to produce a fall of Cc1 , while
the same is not always true for c2.
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necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition to observe positive inter-sectoral comovements in response
to relative-preference shifts.
Before extending the analysis to the role of some selected parameters a further clarication
of our results is needed. As previously pointed out C is not the aggregate consumption. To
build aggregate macroeconomic variables we should dene the aggregation technique and in order
to test our model we should introduce a "more realistic" structure with linkages in the supply-
side, but this is beyond our purpose. Our aim is to show a new possible source of inter-sectoral
comovement, so it is su¢ cient to focus on sectoral variables. Nevertheless it is worth noting that
in the cases with inter-sectoral comovement (blue and red lines in Figure 1), sectoral real variables
and prices move in the same direction. It suggests that emerging sectoral dynamics (expansion
or recession) should characterize in the same way the paths of aggregate variables. Then, results
reported in Figure 1 should be consistent with positive correlation between aggregate variables.
3.4 And what about investment choice?
The behavior of investments depends on the persistence of the shock. So, it is useful to run
another set of simulations with a lower value of the autoregressive coe¢ cient:  = 0:92. Results
are represented in Figure 2. Hereafter, we focus our explanations on the case represented by blue
lines, that is s1 = 0:1, but the same mechanisms work in the other cases (with di¤erent results).
[FIGURE 2]
Some evidence emerge clearly. First, the impulse responses are less persistent. Second, the
intra-sectoral comovements change. Particularly, by reducing the persistence of the preference
shock the responses of sectoral investments change direction. Such mechanisms are the same as
discussed by Wen (2006, 2007) in one sector model: in the absence of increasing returns to scale (as
in this case), not persistent changes in the preference for consumption crowds out investment. It
follows that only persistent increases in consumption demand can sustain investment by prompting
a further increase in labor supply.14 Finally, it has to be noticed that the persistence of the
preferences does not a¤ect the sign of inter-sectoral comovements, because it does not a¤ect the
marginal rates of substitution between consumption goods and leisure.
3.5 The role of relative risk aversion coe¢ cient over consumption ows
Roughly speaking, the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient determines how much the marginal utility
of consumption varies after a change of the consumption basket. Then, it is reasonable to assume
that this parameter may be really relevant in the present framework. In order to illustrate the
e¤ects of a change in , we substitute  = 5 with  = 1:5 and simulate the usual preference shock.
The resulting dynamics are reported in Figure 3.
[FIGURE 3]
14Just as in Wen (2006), the impulse responses show that the response of cj is relatively higher with respect to
that of nj and yj when the  is low.
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The gure shows that with low values of  the positive comovements between sectors vanish.
The reason is that the signicance of the perception e¤ect has strongly decreased. By the dynamic
equation of the rst derivative of the utility function with respect to the consumption basket
(eUC =   eC) (see also the dynamic equation reported in note (9)), it is clear that  is a scale
factor of the e¤ect of C on the marginal utility of consumption. So if  is low, variations in C
poorly a¤ect the relative preference between consumption goods and leisure and thus inter-sectoral
comovements are infrequent.
3.6 The role of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution over leisure
Along the previous simulations we assumed that the marginal utility of leisure was constant. This
assumption allowed us to observe how the impact of the substitution e¤ect and of the perception
e¤ect changes without the inuence of variations in the marginal utility of leisure.
Now, lets remove this hypothesis and solve the model assuming the following utility function:
u(ct; `t; st) =
(Ct)
1  1
1  +
1
vB(1   n1;t   n2;t)v, where (1  v) controls the degree of the risk
aversion and is inversely proportional to the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in leisure.
We set v =  1 and report the impulse response functions in Figure 4.
[FIGURE 4]
Results indicate that positive inter-sectoral comovements are less frequent when v decreases.
This parameter does not directly modify the perception e¤ect or the substitution e¤ect between
consumption goods. The di¤erent dynamics emerge because of the behavior of the marginal
utility of leisure that, when v < 1, is positively related to the labor supply. In fact, the higher
labor supply in sector 1 increases the marginal utility of leisure, and then reduces the incentive
to increase the labor supply also in sector 2. Under this parameterization, the perception e¤ect is
still able to generate positive comovements between sectoral consumption and employment, but
it is not high enough to support investment in sector 2. Total labor supply is less reactive.
4 Discussion and extension
From the previous analysis, an important implication is that a relative preference shift is able to
induce sectoral comovement more likely when the asymmetry of the composition of the consump-
tion index and the risk aversion are high. Indeed, previous simulations have been run under a
quite "comfortable" parameterization in order to report clear impulse response functions in the
gures. That requires to discuss the robustness and the relevance of the proposed mechanism.
Lets start reporting the binding constraints concerning the setting of s1 and  in order to
observe inter and intra sectoral comovement. When  = 5, it is necessary s1  0:179 (upturn)
( c1c2  0:218) or s1  1  0:179 (downturn) ( c1c2  4:587). Otherwise, keeping s1 = 0:1, or s1 = 0:9,
it is necessary   2:1, that falls to 1:56 if s1 = 0:05, or s1 = 0:95.
The linkage between the setting of the risk aversion and the sectoral relative preference emerge
from simulations and is consistent with the suggested economic intuition (the former measures
the e¤ect of a change in C on the marginal utility of consumption, the latter determines the
magnitude of the variation of C after the preference shock). The point is to evaluate if such
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constraint lets the sketched mechanism be relevant. In order to address this issue we consider
proper to reduce, and take constant, the value of the risk aversion (next we run other simulations
with  = 2) and focuses on the interpretation of the asymmetry in the consumption index. We
propose two arguments to support the idea that the constraints on the parameterization setting
do not set aside the relevance of this contribution.
The rst argument concerns the identication of the kinds of goods. Since we consider a
general equilibrium framework, goods 1 and goods 2 represent all the available goods in the
economy. It follows that their relative size can be extremely high, extremely low, or next to one
according to what they represent. For instance, recent kinds of goods may represent a very small
share of the economy and be subject to positive preference shocks.
The second argument concerns the range of the comovement that has to be explained. As
well documented by Hornstein (2000), almost all, but not all, industries of the economy comove.
That implies that in presence of many kinds of goods it is important to identify a mechanism able
to explain the comovement between the most of them. Then, we extend our model to analyze
how the proposed mechanism works in an economy with m di¤erent goods and we show that
a relative preference shock can induce comovement between a lot of sectors without imposing
relevant constraints on parameters. Lets set a more general denition of the consumption index:
Ct =
mY
j=1
c
sj;t
j , (1b)
where
mX
j=1
sj;t = 1, 8t. A shift "t in the relative preferences may change the preference structure
in the following way: sj;t = sj;t 1 + j"t, 8j with
mX
j=1
j = 0. In this case, the partial derivative
of the consumption index with respect to the preference shift is:15
C" = C
mX
j=1
j ln cj . (13)
Notice that, as in the two-sector case, the way the preference shock a¤ects the composite
consumption index inuences the consumption-leisure choice in the same direction in each sector.
That opens endless possibilities according to the composition of C and how the shock hits the
preference for the di¤erent goods. In this generalized case, the perception e¤ect fades out only if
mX
j=1
j ln cj = 0.
Lets focus on the case in which the preference shock concerns only two kinds of goods. For
example, assume j = 0 for j 6= 1; 2 and 1 =  2 = 1. From eq.(13) it follows:
C" = C ln

c1
c2

: (14)
Notice that this time c1 and c2 do not represent the whole economy. Eq.(14) permits to antic-
ipate an important result that will be conrmed by the next simulations: Under the hypotheses
15Hereafter we drop time reference.
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characterizing this stylized economy, a preference shift between two kinds of goods generate co-
movement between all the other goods. That implies that, even if the perception e¤ect is not
su¢ ciently high to induce comovement between the sectors directly a¤ected by the shock (sectors
1 and 2), the preference shift pushes the other (m  2) sectors in the same direction (that changes
according to the sign of ln

c1
c2

).
As example we solve a four-good model with the same characteristics of the two-good model
analyzed in the previous sections. The only changes concern the value of the relative risk aversion,
 = 2 (previously,  = 5) and the value of the persistence coe¢ cient of the preference shock,
 = 0:95 that is consistent with the empirical ndings of Foster et al. (2008) (previously,  = 0:99).
We run two sets of simulations. In the rst set we consider a preference shift between two sectors,
mainly to show that if the aim is to explain comovement between most of (but not all) the economic
sectors, then the proposed mechanism is not signicantly constrained by the parameterization of
the preferences. In the second set of simulations we analyze a preference shift between three
sectors. Specically, we assume that the increase in the preference for a sector may happen at
expense of two sectors. It emerges that splitting the shock between more than two sectors, the
proposed mechanism is able to generate comovement between sectors whose preferences move in
opposite directions with less binding restrictions on the parameter setting.
The rst set of simulations of the impulse response functions is reported in Figure 5, while
Table 2 resumes the setting of the preferences and reports the sectoral outcomes. The common
hypothesis is that 1 =  4 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 0. The analyzed cases di¤er in the parame-
terization of the relative preferences. In case (I) the sectors directly a¤ected by the shock have
the same weight in the consumption index, then there is no perception e¤ect. The sector with
the positive shock grows, the sector with the negative shock falls, while the others remain stable.
In case (II) there is high asymmetry among the weights of the sectors directly a¤ected by the
shock. That produces a high push towards comovement and all the sectors moves (up) in the
same direction, including the sector with the decreasing preference. Case (III) and case (IV)
conrm that the dynamics of the sectors, whose relative preferences do not change, depend on
the perception e¤ect. Indeed, it is worth noting that, given s1 and s4, the values of s2 and s3 do
not a¤ect the dynamics of sector 2 and sector 3 and that the dynamics of these sectors in case
(III) are exactly the inverse of those in case (IV), since parameters have been chosen to produce
the same perception e¤ect but with the opposite sign.
The last set of simulations (see Table 3 and Figure 6) assumes that 1 =  4   3 = 1 and
2 = 0. Case (V) and case (VI) are characterized by the same structure of the relative preferences
but di¤erent values of 3 and 4. The perception e¤ect is strong and pushes towards an increase
in consumption in both cases: In case (V) all the sectors experience an upturn, while in case (VI)
sector 4 experiences a downturn because it is the most negatively a¤ected by the shock.16 Case
(VII) takes to similar results of case (VI) but with less asymmetry between the size of the sectors.
That indicates that the theoretical mechanism presented in this paper can explain comovement
also between sectors whose relative preferences go in opposite directions (sector 1 and sector 4)
not only with extreme parameter setting. Finally, case (VIII) represents a special combination of
parameter values that produces an almost null perception e¤ect. That induces dynamics similar
to case (I) (the sector(s) with stable relative preferences do(es) not move).
16Consistently with the parameterization, Figure (6) shows that sector 1 and sector 2 have the same dynamics
in case (V) and in case (VI), while sector 3 experiences higher increase in case (VI) than in case (V).
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Table 2 Sectoral dynamics after a shock that a¤ects positively s1 and negatively s4.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
s1 0:25 0:05 0:2 0:4
s2 0:4 0:05 0:3 0:2
s3 0:1 0:05 0:1 0:2
s4 0:25 0:85 0:4 0:2
1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4  1  1  1  1
sectors in upturn 1 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 1
sectors in downturn 4 ? 4 2, 3, 4
stable sectors 2, 3 ? ? ?
Table 3 Sectoral dynamics after a shock that a¤ects positively s1 and negatively s3 and s4.
(V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
s1 0:05 0:05 0:2 0:25
s2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:3
s3 0:45 0:45 0:4 0:3
s4 0:45 0:45 0:35 0:15
1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 0 0
3  0:5  0:1  0:9  0:75
4  0:5  0:9  0:1  0:25
sectors in upturn 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 4 1
sectors in downturn ? 4 3 3, 4
stable sectors ? ? ? 2
5 Conclusions
The main intent of this paper is to suggest a new source of sectoral comovements during busi-
ness cycles. In this model relative preference shocks between consumption goods, which may be
interpreted as shocks to householdstastes, are the only mechanism generating uctuation. The
results indicate that in order to induce inter and intra sectoral comovement in a stylized economy
with only two kinds of goods, constraints on the parameter setting are necessary (especially on
risk aversion and relative preferences) but, at least in our opinion, not so binding to make the
theoretical point irrelevant. In the last section, we have shown that extending the analysis to a
multi-sector model and introducing a more exible structure of the propagation of the preference
shock, constraints on the parameter setting become much less severe. Consistently with the em-
pirical evidence reported in Hornstein (2000), the model generates comovement between almost
all, but not all, industries of the economy under a vast range of parameterizations. In this case,
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both the values of the relative preferences and the spread of the preference shock determine the
direction of the comovement and the number of sectors involved.
In fact, the (whole) economy tends to expansions (recession) when preferences shift towards
goods that represent a minor (major) share in the consumption basket. This is due to the fact that
households obtain less satisfaction by the consumption basket chosen before the shock (perception
e¤ect). Consequently, they increase the labor supply in order to restore the optimal condition
between leisure and each kind of consumption goods.
Moreover, this model suggests clear indications concerning the role of some parameters. Main
results are briey reported. First, the persistence of the preference shift strongly a¤ects the
responses of investments. This is due to the fact that  determines the duration of the perception
e¤ect and, consequently, it a¤ects the inter-temporal optimal path of consumption. Second, the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion , determines the relevance of the perception e¤ect in the trade-o¤
between consumption and leisure in each sector. Finally, if the marginal utility of leisure is
increasing in labor supply, the perception e¤ect has to be higher in order to generate positive
inter-sectoral comovements.
The sketched mechanism is quite new in economic literature. In fact, multi-sectoral mod-
els generally tend to explain positive comovements of economic sectors relying on input-output
structure that transmits sectoral shocks over the entire economy.
It should be emphasized that this model di¤ers from models such Bencivenga (1992) and
Wen (2006, 2007) which consider direct variations in the relative preference between consumption
and leisure, independently of the composition of consumption basket. This can be due to the
fact that leisure time is employed in other activities (as homework production, see Benhabib et
al., 1991), or it can be induced by alternative phases of the "urge to consume" (see Wen, 2006)
that modies the importance of consumption. On the contrary, this model focuses on two other
elements: the starting composition of consumption basket and the shifts in relative preference
between consumption goods. The last element is studied in Phelan and Trejos (2000), but they
use such element in order to explain aggregate uctuations with negative comovement in sectoral
employment.
Particularly interesting implications and extensions of the model concern the analysis of ad-
vertising and innovation. Both elements can produce externalities which strongly resemble to that
analyzed in this paper. This opens other research elds that lie outside this model.
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Appendix
A. Steady State
From Euler equations (11):
k1
n1
=
 
11
1
   1 + 1
! 1
1 1
k2
n2
=
 
22
1
   1 + 2
! 1
1 2
Combining the rst-order conditions for consumption and labor:
c1 =

s1TT
s2(1 ) (1  1)1
B

k1
n1
1 1(s1+s2)+1 s1 s2
c2 = TTc1
Ct = c
s1
1 c
s2
2
where TT = s2s1
(1 2)2k22 n
 2
2
(1 1)1k11 n
 1
1
. The feasibility constraint implies:
k1 =
 
1

k1
n1
1 1
  1
! 1
c1;t
k2 =
 
2

k2
n2
2 1
  2
! 1
c2;t
Finally using the capital accumulation process:
i1 = 1k1
i2 = 2k2
n1 =

k1
n1
 1
k1
n2 =

k2
n2
 1
k2
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B. Calibration of B
We assume that:
n1 + n2 = N = 0:3
Using eq.(8) and eq.(9) it is possible to express working time in the following way:
N =
0@k1
n1
 1 
1

k1
n1
1 1
  1
! 1
+

k2
n2
 1 
2

k2
n2
2 1
  2
! 1
TT
1A c1
Substituting the steady state value of c1 and nding the value of B according to the parametriza-
tion of nj :
B =
0BB@
 
k1
n1
 1
1

k1
n1
1 1   1 1 +  k2n2 12  k2n22 1   2 1 TT
!



s1TT
s2(1 ) (1  1)1

k1
n1
1
N 
1CCA
C. Log-Linearization
1. ~s1;t   ec1;t + (1  ) eCt + 1ek1;t   1en1;t = 0
2. ~s2;t   ec2;t + (1  ) eCt + 2ek2;t   2en2;t = 0
3. y1ey1;t = c1ec1;t + i1ei1;t
4. y2ey2;t = c2ec2;t + i2ei2;t
5. k1ek1;t+1 = (1  1)k1ek1;t + i1ei1;t
6. k2ek2;t+1 = (1  2)k2ek2;t + i2ei2;t
7. ey1;t = 1ek1;t + (1  1) en1;t
8. ey2;t = 2ek2;t + (1  2) en2;t
9. r1er1;t = 1 (1   1) k1 11 n1 11 ek1;t + 1 (1  1) k1 11 n1 11 en1;t
10. r2er2;t = 2 (2   1) k2 12 n1 22 ek2;t + 2 (1  2) k2 12 n1 22 en2;t
11. eCt = s1ec1;t + s2ec2;t + s1 ln(c1)es1;t + s2 ln(c2)es2;t
12. eNt = n1N en1;t + n2N en2;t
13. s2es2;t =  s1es1;t
14. es1;t   es2;t   ec1;t + ec2;t + 1ek1;t + (1  1) en1;t = 0
15. es2;t   es1;t   ec2;t + ec1;t + 2ek2;t + (1  2) en2;t = 0
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16.  ep1;t + es1;t + (1  ) eCt   ec1;t   (1  v) N1 N eNt = 0
17.  ep2;t + es2;t + (1  ) eCt   ec2;t   (1  v) N1 N eNt = 0
Forward equations:
18. 1 = es1;t+1   es1;t + ec1;t   ec1;t+1 + (1  ) eCt+1   (1  ) eCt + er1;t+1
19. 1 = es2;t+1   es2;t + ec2;t   ec2;t+1 + (1  ) eCt+1   (1  ) eCt + er2;t+1
D.
Proof. We now proof that @
2C
@c1@s1
> 0:From (1):
@C
@c1
= s1c
s1 1
1 c
1 s1
2 ; 0 < s1 < 1
and the corresponding steady state equation is:
c1
c2
=
s1
1  s1
The derivative of @C@c1 with respect to s1is given by:
@2C
@c1@s1
= cs1 11 c
1 s1
2

1 + s1 ln

c1
c2

and then
1 + s1 ln

c1
c2

> 0
from which:
e >

c2
c1
s1
substituting the steady state values of c1 and c2, leads to:
e
1
s1 s1 + s1   1 > 0
as et > t, for t > 1, the following always holds:
et
t
+
1
t
  1 > 0
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E.
Proof. We now proof that @
2C
@c2@s1
< 0: From (1)
@C
@c2
= (1  s1) cs11 c s12 ; 0 < s1 < 1
and in steady state:
c1
c2
=
s1
1  s1
The derivative of @C@c2 with respect to s1 is:
@2C
@c2@s1
=  cs11 c s12

1  (1  s1) ln

c1
c2

and it proves that
1  (1  s1) ln

c1
c2

> 0
it follows that:
e >

c1
c2
1 s1
substituting the steady state values of c1 and c2 leads to:
e
1
1 s1 (1  s1)  s1 > 0
Setting t = 11 s1 , leads again to:
et
t
+
1
t
  1 > 0
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Figure 1: IRFs benchmark version
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Figure 2: IRFs Low persistence
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Figure 3: IRFs Low r.r.a over consumption
0 20 40 60 80
0
2
4
6
8
N1
0 20 40 60 80
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
N2
0 20 40 60 80
0
1
2
3
4
C1
0 20 40 60 80
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
C2
0 20 40 60 80
0
2
4
6
8
I1
0 20 40 60 80
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
I2
0 20 40 60 80
0
1
2
3
4
5
Y1
0 20 40 60 80
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Y2
0 20 40 60 80
-0.5
0
0.5
C
0 20 40 60 80
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
N
0 20 40 60 80
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
p1
0 20 40 60 80
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
p2
s1=0.1 (blue) s1=.5 (green) s1=.9 (red)
Figure 4: IRFs High r.r.a over leisure
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